CIVIL PROCEDURE-ArTACHMENT-JURISDICTION

OVER

NONRESI-

DENTS OBTAINED BY ATTACHING INSURANCE PROCEEDS IS INVALID--

State ex rel. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d
942 (St. Louis, Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C.
455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970).
On April 5, 1968 Louise Taussig, a resident of Missouri, was entering her son's parked car in Newport, Rhode Island when Jerome D.
Slack, a Rhode Island resident, collided with it. Mrs. Taussig instituted an action against Slack in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County
on April 16, 1969 to recover for her personal injuries. Based on an affidavit as to Slack's nonresidency in Missouri, an attachment and summons was issued to the Sheriff of Cole County, Missouri commanding
him to summon as garnishee Government Employees Insurance Company of Washington, D.C., a foreign corporation authorized to do business in Missouri.
Prior to the accident the relator, Government Employees, had issued a liability policy to Slack. The policy was of the usual form, obligating the insurer to defend the insured and indemnify him for successful claims against him. On May 16, 1969 the defendant Slack, appearing specially, filed a motion to dissolve, vacate and quash the
attachment and summons by virtue of which the plaintiff was attempting to obtain jurisdiction, contending that the method of attachment
was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution, statutes and common law of Missouri. On July 15, 1969 Lasky,
the respondent judge, entered an order denying the defendant's motion. Thereafter, the relator filed a petition for a writ of prohibition
and a preliminary rule was issued granting it. The Missouri courts
later made this rule permanent.'
In a similar attachment action, Carolyn G. Howard sought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when she was allegedly
struck by the propeller of an aircraft at an airport in South Carolina.
Donald L. Allen, the defendant and alleged operator of the aircraft,
was a resident of Ohio. Unable to obtain personal service of process
upon the defendant in South Carolina, the plaintiff caused a warrant
of attachment to issue, directing the seizure of the applicable limits
of liability and the duty to defend contained in the policy issued by
American Motorists Insurance Company to the defendant.
The defendant appeared specially for the purpose of objecting
I State ex rel. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (St. Louis,
Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
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to the jurisdiction of the court, and moved to quash service of the summons and to vacate the warrant of attachment. In support of his
motion, he filed affidavits to the effect that he was a lifelong resident of Ohio, never owned property in South Carolina, and never conducted business with the American Motorists Insurance Company in
South Carolina. His motions were granted by the lower court and the
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the
duty to defend and limits of liability contained in the liability insurance policy do not constitute a debt which is subject to attachment so as
2
to confer jurisdiction.
The term jurisdiction may be used in several senses, but in its general and ordinary use it is the power lawfully conferred on the court
to entertain a suit, consider the merits, and render a binding decision
thereon.3 Regardless of the type of jurisdiction involved-in personam,
in rem, or quasi-in-rem 4-three essential components must exist so
that a court may invoke its jurisdiction. The court must be empowered
to act by the sovereign, 5 it must have subject matter jurisdiction and it
6
must give proper notice to the parties.
The most common method of obtaining jurisdiction, the in personam method, is effectuated by personal service on a defendant
2 Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970).
3 See General Inv. Co. v. N.Y. Central R.R., 271 U.S. 228, 230 (1926) (bill in equity
by a minority stockholder against a railroad company where the court ruled that the
suit arose under the laws of the United States and was within the jurisdiction of the federal district court, and differentiated between jurisdiction and the lack of merit or capacity
to sue).
4 An in personam action decides the rights between the adversary parties. An in
rem action determines the status of a particular res as "against the whole world," irrespective of the parties involved in the litigation. And, in a quasi-in-rem proceeding,
the res is used to obtain personal jurisdiction, and the satisfaction of the judgment
is limited to the value of the attached res. Comment, Attachment of "Obligations"--A
New Chapter in Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 769, 770 (1967). See also
Note, Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 948-49
(1960).
5 A court's power is derived constitutionally; see, e.g., U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 1:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.
See also N.J. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1-7; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1-37.
6 See Spencer v. Gypsy Oil Co., 142 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1944) (court held that jurisdiction of subject matter necessary to a valid judgment includes power to determine, with
binding effect, every justiciable issue involved). Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (petition by a trust company for a judicial settlement of account;
court held that notice by publication was sufficient for beneficiaries whose interests or
addresses were unknown, but that such notice to known persons whose whereabouts were
known was insufficient).
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physically present within the state in which the action is brought.1
However, this physical presence foundation of jurisdiction has been
expanded, in the interest of justice and fairness to the plaintiff, to include other situations. For instance, if the defendant is "doing business,'' or is involved in an automobile accident, or has some other
special contact with the forum state,1 0 he will be subject to that
court's jurisdiction provided he has been given proper notice of the
action against him. 1 The leading case in this area is InternationalShoe
Co. v. Washington,12 which held that a defendant with certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state will be subject to a court's jurisdiction if maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."'13
A state may also exercise jurisdiction in its in rem or quasi-in-rem
forms if it has attachment power over a particular res. 14 Attach7 See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) (in a suit upon a promissory note,
begun by publication when the defendant was domiciled in Texas but had left the state
with the intent to establish a home elsewhere, the Court held that defendant was a
nonresident and that personal service of process was required); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877) (action for the recovery of a tract of land, Court held a personal judgment
not valid against a nonresident who was served by publication and who did not appear
to defend).
8 See Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (the Court upheld an Iowa
statute which provided for service of process in any action arising out of the operation
of a business office maintained there on any agent or clerk employed there).
9 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (Court held valid a Massachusetts statute
declaring the use of the state's highways by a nonresident the equivalent to an appointment by him of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles as his attorney upon whom process may
be served).
10 See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (the Court
held that where parties to a contract agree in advance to permit notice to be served on
nonresident defendant, jurisdiction is properly obtained); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (Court held that jurisdiction based on a California statute,
which subjects foreign corporations to suit in California on insurance contracts with
residents of that state even though such corporations cannot be served personally, was
valid); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (Court held that the authority of a state
over one of its domiciliaries is not terminated by his temporary absence).
11 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
12 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (Court held that the activities within the state by the defendant's salesman, including exhibiting samples of merchandise and soliciting orders from
prospective buyers to be accepted or rejected at a point outside the state, constituted
"doing business" and thereby made the defendant amenable to service of process).
13 Id. at 316, quoting from Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).

14 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (a citizen of North Carolina who owed money
to another citizen of that state was, while temporarily in Maryland, garnisheed by a
creditor of the man to whom he owed the money). See also cases cited note 7 supra;
Comment, 16 BUFFALo L. REV. 769, supra note 4, at 770-71 (brief discussion of attach.
ment of res-corporeal and incorporeal).
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ment is a proceeding for seizure of property, or ordinary debts, and it is
tantamount to an involuntary dispossession of the defendant prior to
any adjudication of the plaintiff's rights. 15 If the res is an intangible,
the state has jurisdiction over it provided it has jurisdiction over the
debtor.'
The courts in Lasky and Howard were asked to decide whether a
contractual obligation to defend and indemnify constituted an attachable debt, so as to confer quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in a state whose only
contact with the defendant is that his insurer does business there. It is
a relatively new question and only New York has held that such a contractual obligation is attachable. The New York rule was first applied
8
in Seider v. Roth,17 a case similar to Lasky and Howard.'
The majority in Seider reasoned that as soon as the accident occurred, a contractual obligation was imposed on the insurance company
which should be considered a debt within the meaning of the applicable
New York statutes:
[T]he policy casts on the insurer several obligations which accrue
as soon as the insurer gets notice of an accident, and whether or
not a suit is ever brought. For instance, under the "Insuring Agreements" and under "Additional Agreements" "No. 2", the insurer
agrees upon receipt of notice of loss or damage to investigate and if
expedient to negotiate or settle with the claimant. Furthermore,
under "Section B" the insurer agrees to pay necessary medical and
similar expenses of the insured and any other injured person. 19
15 Russell v. Fred G. Pohl Co., 7 N.J. 32, 39, 80 A.2d 191, 194 (1951) (in an action
by plaintiff to attach a debtor's obligation to the defendant, court held that, by virtue
of assignments by the defendant to a third party, the relation of debtor and creditor
had ceased to exist and there was no property available to attach).
16 Comment, 16 BUFiFALo L. Rv.769, supra note 4, at 771 n.26.
17 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), aff'g 23 App. Div. 2d 787,
258 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1965).
18 In Seider, two New York residents were injured in an automobile accident in
Vermont, allegedly through the negligence of the defendant, and they sought to attach
the contractual obligation of the defendant's insurer to defend and indemnify the defendant.
19 17 N.Y.2d at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The statutes under consideration are:
1) N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5201(a) (McKinney 1963): A money judgment may be
enforced against any debt, which is past due or which is yet to become due,
certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor ....
2) N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 6202 (McKinney 1963) provides in part: Any debt or
property against which a money judgment may be enforced as provided in
section 5201 is subject to attachment.
The majority cited In re Estate of Riggle, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d
416 (1962), as its authority, but it may be distinguished because of the special nature of
the proceeding. The court in Riggle relied upon Surrogate's Act 47, now encompassed
in N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. LAW § 208 (McKinney 1967): "For the purpose of conferring
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In dissenting to the majority opinion, Justice Burke construed the
insurance policy in such a manner that the contractual obligations were
not attachable under the statute. 20 He reasoned that the obligations to
defend and indemnify were not obligations "past due" and would not
be "certain" until jurisdiction was properly obtained. The justice further criticized the circular reasoning of the majority: "The jurisdiction,
they assert, is based upon a promise which evidently does not mature
21
until there is jurisdiction."
Seider and its sister case, Simpson v. Loehmann,22 have met with
substantial criticism in numerous commentaries. 2 While it is not impossible to point out some property right in the insured, there are so
many concurrent problems, not considered by Seider, that it would appear wiser to leave the insurer's obligations unattachable. 24 For example, if the attachment were allowed, an appearance by the defendant
could, in some jurisdictions, subject him to personal service and posjurisdiction upon the [surrogate] court: 1. A debt or a cause of action for wrongful
death, in favor of a non-domiciliary against a domiciliary, is deemed personal property
in the county where the domiciliary . . . resides." (emphasis added). Also, the case is
distinguishable because there was in personam jurisdiction over the defendant at the
time of attachment.
The court in Seider further relied on Fishman v. Sanders, 18 App. Div. 2d 689, 235
N.Y.S.2d 861 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 298, 258 N.Y.S.2d 380, 206 N.E.2d
326 (1965); Stines v. Hertz Corp., 42 Misc. 2d 443, 248 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on
other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 823, 254 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1964), afl'd, 16 N.Y.2d 605, 209
N.E.2d 105, 261 N.V.S.2d 59 (1965); Baumgold Bros., Inc. v. Schwarzschild Bros., Inc., 276
App. Div. 158, 93 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1949). All are distinguishable, however, in that in
personam jurisdiction existed over the insurer and insured.
20 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5201(a) (McKinney 1963), quoted note 19 supra.
21 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
22 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), rearg. denied, 21 N.Y.2d
990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968). See also Alex v. Grande, 56 Misc. 2d 931,
290 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Powsner v. Mills, 56 Misc. 2d 411, 288 N.Y.S.2d 846
(Sup. Ct. 1968); Lefcourt v. Sea Crest Hotel & Motor Inn, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 376, 282
N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Jones v. McNeill, 51 Misc. 2d 527, 273 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup.
Ct. 1966) (all followed Seider in allowing the attachment of insurance obligations).
23 See, e.g., Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction over Non-Residents--New
York Goes Wild, 35 INs. COUNSEL J. 118 (1968); Comment, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 769, supra
note 4; Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate
Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 550 (1967); Comment, Attachment of Liability Insurance
Policies, 53 CORNELL L. REy. 1108 (1968); Comment, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on
Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654 (1967).
See also Housley v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967) (does not mention Seider but case refused to allow a similar attachment); DeRentiis v. Lewis, - R.I. -,
258 A.2d 464 (1969) (rejects Seider but distinguishes itself on differences between Rhode
Island and New York attachment statutes).
24 Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentary at 68, N.Y. Civ. PsRAc. LAw § 5201
(McKinney Supp. 1970-71).
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sible liability for a judgment in excess of the insurer's obligations.2 5 Or,
if the attachment were allowed and the defendant did not appear, he
would violate the cooperation clause, thus nullifying the insurer's duty
to defend. 26 Or, if the attachment were allowed and the defendant did
not appear, any judgment awarded to the plaintiff, notwithstanding a
27
cooperation violation, would be unenforceable.
It is apparent that cases where the defendant is not in the forum
state, because of the inherent problems involved with quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction, would best be handled in an alternative manner. Two
such methods utilized have been substituted service of process and direct action, both of which involve in personam jurisdiction. Substituted
service utilizes service of process on the insurer as the agent and acts
as notice to the named defendant. Direct action would allow the injured party to bring an action against the insurer as a real party in interest without first obtaining a judgment against the insured.
Courts in New York and New Jersey have held that substituted
service upon the insured's carrier is a valid method of obtaining service of process over the insured. This method received initial consideration in a series of New York cases, the most influential being Dob25 This reasoning was the basis for the federal court decision in PodoIsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), which held that attachment of the insurer's obligations in a nonresident defendant's policy is unconstitutional. Podolsky distinguished
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), the leading case in debt attachment. In Podolsky the
amount of debt was not fixed, as it was in Harris, and it could have been influenced by
the defendant's choice of appearance. This would in effect have coerced the defendant
to submit to personal jurisdiction and would have been a denial of fair play and
substantial justice. The court based its decision on N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 320(c) (McKinney
1963), by virtue of which appearance in defense of the action submits a defendant to
personal jurisdiction in New York.
However, the New York courts avoided Podolsky's appearance objection by holding
in the Simpson reargument, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968),
that a limited appearance is permitted in a nonresident defendant case, notwithstanding
§ 320(c). The court circumvented the Podolsky rule by restricting the value of any judgment to the policy limit, making it impossible for the defendant to be personally liable.
26 The insurer is bound to defend the insured against suits alleging facts and circumstances covered by the policy, even though such suits are groundless, false, or fraudulent. See 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4682 (2d ed. 1962). See also

Ebert v. Balter, 83 N.J. Super. 545, 200 A.2d 532 (Cty. Ct. 1964); Spezio v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 762, 292 N.Y.S.2d 4, aff'd, 30 App. Div. 2d 777, 292 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1968).
However, the insured is under an obligation to cooperate with the insurer in the
preparation of his defense. A breach of the cooperation clause by the insured will operate
to relieve the insurer of liability under the policy. See 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTiCE § 4772 (2d ed. 1962).
27 The property attached was the insurer's obligation to defend; that is the only

thing that the judgment is good against. It is impossible to measure this obligation.
See Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentary at 69, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 5201
(McKinney Supp. 1970-71).
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kin v. Chapman, Sellars v. Raye, and Keller v. Rappoport.28 The court
in Keller held that this mode of service was authorized by statute29 and
did not violate constitutional due process.
[A]ttempts to locate the defendant were . . . unsuccessful. The
plaintiff then applied to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for
an ex parte order under paragraph 4 of CPLR 308. The court determined that service on the defendant under paragraphs 1, 2 and
3 of 308 was impracticable and, acting pursuant to paragraph 4,
directed that service be made (1) by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant's last known address in
New York (in Long Beach) and (2) by delivering copies thereof to

the insurance carrier3 0

In affirming the issuance of the court order Justice Fuld quoted
from Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.: 3 1 "[I]t has been
recognized that, in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is
all that the situation permits .... ,,32
He also designated four factors to
be used as a guideline for proper substituted service on the insurer:
(1) the plaintiff's need, (2) the public interest, (3) the reasonableness of
plaintiff's efforts to inform defendant and (4) the availability of other
safeguards for defendant's interest. 3
28 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968) (these three cases were
consolidated and treated in one opinion by Chief Judge Fuld. Keller v. Rappoport involved service on defendant's insurance carrier, and Dobkin and Sellars involved service
on the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation and the Secretary of State.
The decision will hereafter be referred to as Keller v. Rappoport). See also Lerman v.
Church, 54 Misc. 2d 402, 282 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
29 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 308 (McKinney 1963):
Personal service upon a natural person shall be made:
1. by delivering the summons within the state to the person to be served;
or
2. except in matrimonial actions, by delivering the summons within the
state to the agent for service designated under rule 318 of the person to be served;
or
3. where service under paragraph one cannot be made with due diligence,
by mailing the summons to the person to be served at his last known residence
and either affixing the summons to the door of his place of business, dwelling
house or usual place of abode within the state or delivering the summons within
the state to a person of suitable age and discretion at the place of business,
dwelling house or usual place of abode of the person to be served and proof of
such service shall be filed with the clerk of the court designated in the summons
and service is complete ten days thereafter; or
4. in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs, if
service is impracticable under paragraph one, two or three of this section.
30 21 N.Y.2d at 497, 236 N.E.2d at 454, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
31 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
32 Id. at 317, quoted at 21 N.Y.2d at 503, 236 N.E.2d at 458, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
33 21 N.Y.2d at 503, 236 N.E.2d at 458, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
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New Jersey adopted the method of substituted personal service in
Rudikoff v. Byrne.8 4 There the plaintiff attempted to serve process on
35
the defendant under the New Jersey nonresident motorists statute.
However, the defendant had moved without informing the New York
Department of Motor Vehicles as required by law in that state 3 6 and
the plaintiff thereafter served defendant's insurance carrier. The court
held that substituted service would be permitted if it were " 'authorized
by the law * * * of the state wherein service is effected', within the
meaning of ...R.R. 4:4-4(j)."'37 The court then pointed out that such
service was authorized in New York by Keller and consequently was
valid in New Jersey provided R.R. 4:4-4(j) and R.R. 4:4-5(a) were com38
plied with.
Rudikoif was followed by Ledbetter v. Schnur 3 9 a case very similar
on its facts. The court in Ledbetter distinguished Rudikoif, however:
"Rudikoff ...clearly holds that service was allowed because New York
law was followed. ' ' 40 The court in Ledbetter sought to establish a substituted service rule in New Jersey which was not dependent on the
law of the defendant's state. Judge Owens in Ledbetter, pursuant to
this ideal, stated: "It is recognized that there should be some provision
in the rules to authorize this type of service." 41 The judge then noted
that the New York statute utilized in Keller is relatively the same as R.
34 101

N.J. Super. 29, 242 A.2d 880 (L. Div. 1968).

85 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:7-1 et seq. (1961).

§ 501(g) (McKinney 1970).
87 101 N.J. Super. at 36, 242 A.2d at 884. R.R. 4:4-40) stated:
Whenever it shall appear . . .that, after diligent inquiry and effort, an individual cannot be served in this State under any of the preceding paragraphs
of this rule, then, consistent with due process of law, service may be made by
mailing ... a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual addressed
to his dwelling house or usual place of abode. Where service is . . . not effected . . . or if for any reason delivery cannot be made, then service may
be made outside the State as provided in Rule 4:4-5(a) upon any person upon whom
service isauthorized by the law of this State or of the state wherein service is effected. (emphasis added).
R.R. 4:4-4(j) is now R. 4:4-4(e), which is to the same effect. R.R. 4:4-5(a) provided that,
when service is made in another state, it may be done:
[I]n the same manner as if service were made within the State, except that service shall be made by... [an official having authority in the jurisdiction wherein
the service is made].
R.R. 4:4-5(a) is now R. 4:4-5(a), which is to the same effect.
38 101 N.J. Super. at 42, 242 A.2d at 887-88.
89 107 N.J. Super. 479, 259 A.2d 237 (L. Div. 1969).
40 Id. at 481, 259 A.2d at 239.
41 Id. at 482, 259 A.2d at 239.
36 N.Y. VEH. & TSAF. LAw
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of the New Jersey rules. The court allowed substituted service
on an insurance carrier where the usual modes of service are "either
impossible or unduly oppressive upon plaintiff or where the defendant
' 43
successfully evades service of process.
Practically speaking, substituted service offers little advantage
over the attachment technique of Seider and Simpson. If the service
is allowed and defendant fails to appear, then the insurance carrier
44
could deny liability under the policy for failure to cooperate.
Due to the shortcomings of the present situation, practical appraisal rather than "magical and medieval concepts of presence and
power" 45 should be used to determine jurisdiction. Both Howard and
Lasky express sympathy for the plaintiff but neither court was ready
or able to overturn its respective state statutes without legislative
support. As expressed in Howard,
It may very well be that her [the plaintiff's] plight and that of
others similarly situated deserves the serious consideration of the
General Assembly, but this court is, of course, not empowered to
46
legislate.
It has been suggested that it would be in the interest of fair play
and substantial justice to the involved parties and the public if direct
actions were allowed in nonresident defendant cases. 47 A direct action
4:4-4(i)42

42 Id. at 483, 259 A.2d at 240. R. 4:4-4(i) reads as follows:

If service cannot be made by any of the modes provided by this rule, any
defendant may be served as provided by court order, consistent with due process
of law.
43 107 N.J. Super. at 482, 259 A.2d at 239; accord, Young v. Bunny Bazaar, Inc., 107
N.J. Super. 320, 258 A.2d 158 (L. Div. 1969) (court held that where an automobile liability insurer for one nonresident defendant had knowledge of the accident, and plaintiff
had made diligent effort to obtain service upon the nonresidents, service of summons
on the insurer was valid). Compare Last v. Burns, 108 N.J. Super. 525, 261 A.2d 726 (L.
Div. 1970) (motion to make substituted service upon Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment
Fund in lieu of service upon defendants personally; court held that the Fund was not
authorized to accept substituted personal service on known but absent defendants)
with Feuchtbaum v. Constantini, 110 N.J. Super. 515, 266 A.2d 168 (L. Div. 1970) (motion
for an order permitting the plaintiffs to serve the defendants by substituted service upon
the Uninsured Motorists Fund because the defendants were avoiding service held, contrary to Last v. Burns, to be implicitly authorized by R. 4:4-4(i)).
44 See note 26 supra.
45 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
46 254 S.C. at 460, 176, S.E.2d at 130.
47 Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentary at 51. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 5201 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
IA. REv. STAT. § 22:655 (1950), providing for a direct action, states in pertinent
part:
The injured person . . . shall have a right of direct action against the insurer
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would allow an injured plaintiff to institute a suit against the carrier
without first recovering a judgment against the insured. A direct action
could be accomplished in either of two ways: 1) insurance companies
could be required to consent to direct actions; or 2) the legislators could
amend present statutes to allow direct actions in nonresident defendant
situations. 48 Safeguards, it is submitted, could be instituted to protect a
defendant from a gross abuse of a direct action statute. For instance,
such an abuse would arise if a California plaintiff instituted a suit in
his home state against the insurer of a New Jersey defendant and forced
the carrier to defend an action which arose in Florida. This would place
an unfair burden on the insurer in the preparation of its defense because of the great distance between the accident state and the forum
state. The doctrine of forum non conveniens could help provide adequate protection for the defendant while securing a fair disposition of
the plaintiff's claim. Determinative factors of forum non conveniens
are:
[R]elative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses; possibility of a view, if
appropriate; and all other practical problems that would make
the trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. In appraising the factors of public interest, it is also appropriate to give
some consideration to the relative
state of trial calendar conges49
tion in the districts involved.
Also, the doctrines of "substantial interest" or lex loci delicti will be
applied, regardless of the state in which the action is instituted, 50 and
will further help to protect the defendant.
within the terms and limits of the policy in the parish where the accident or
injury occurred or in the parish where the insured has his domicile, and said
action may be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and
the insurer, jointly and in solido.
See also Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (Court held the
Louisiana direct action statute constitutional).
48 Comment, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1108, supra note 23, at 1120.
49 United States v. General Motors Corp., 183 F. Supp. 858, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
50 The choice of law in tort cases, depending on the jurisdiction, is governed by either
of two theories, the lex loci delicti doctrine or "substantial interest" doctrine. The former
rule calls for the application of the law of the state where the wrong occurred. In applying
the substantial interest doctrine, the court determines the applicable law based upon the
interest of the litigants and the states involved. The court measures a multitude of factors
subjectively and the state which holds the greatest interest in the controversy will have its
laws applied to the case. Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Pfau v. Trent
Alum. Co., 106 N.J. Super. 324, 255 A.2d 792 (App. Div. 1969), rev'd, 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d
129 (1970); Mullane v. Stavola, 101 N.J. Super. 184, 243 A.2d 842 (L. Div. 1968); Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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NO TES

A direct action statute offers no practical advantage over substituted service because of the constant threat of violation of the cooperation clause by the insured. The purpose of a cooperation clause is to
protect the insurer's interest and prevent collusion between the insured
and the injured person. 5 '
The design of the [cooperation] provision in question was
not only to obviate the risk of a covinous or collusive combination
between the assured and the injured third party, but also to restrain the assured from voluntary action materially prejudicial
to the insurer's contractual rights, especially in the exercise52 of its
exclusive function to defend claims made under the policy.

This principle has historically involved the situation where jurisdiction
has been obtained over the insured and he is asked to cooperate with
the insurer in the preparation of his defense. However, in a nonresident defendant situation, an injured party cannot gain service of
process over the insured and wants to force the insurer to defend when
there is a distinct possibility that a violation of the cooperation clause
will occur. A default by the insured could seriously prejudice the insurer if he were forced to defend without the cooperation of the insured. On the other hand, if the insurer were allowed to disclaim liability because of a cooperation clause violation, the plaintiff would
have no available remedy, unless he could locate and serve the defendant, which he would have presumably already discovered to be
impossible.
Two methods of handling the situation have been suggested: 1)
force the insurer to defend notwithstanding cooperation clause violations; or 2) grant the defendant immunity from imposition of personal liability over the policy limits so that he will be encouraged to
appear. 53 The first would be impractical because of the obvious prejudicial effect on the insurer. The second method, however, has distinct advantages; it would allow a trial on the merits with the
defendant being present, and it would allow the plaintiff a recovery
to the extent of the policy limits, thereby mitigating his losses. Regardless of the approach taken by the legislature, action is required to
provide more modern and realistic protection for a plaintiff in a
nonresident situation.
Steven P. Russo
51 Kindervater v. Motorists Cas. Ins. Co., 120 N.J.L. 373, 199 A. 606 (Ct. Err. & App.
1938).
52 Id. at 376, 199 A. at 608.
5s3 Comment. 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1108, supra note 23, at 1120.

